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Abstract 
Doing science involves the development and evaluation of models.  These models are not objective 
truths but can be understood as explanations, which scientists use to explore and reason about an 
aspect of the world.  Learning science involves students expressing and engaging with models in the 
classroom.  However, this learning should not be seen as the growth of subjective understanding 
towards a correct scientific view.  Students, like scientists, use myriad models to consider and explain 
the world.  In this paper, I will argue that recognising the role of models in both doing and learning 
science compels teachers to focus on the models that emerge in their classrooms. 
 
 
Intro  
In this article I will argue that models are integral to both doing and learning science, but they can 
also be a source of confusion to students.  Models emerge within specific contexts as scientists, 
students and teachers seek to explain phenomena in the world (and broader universe).  It is through 
these models that scientists and students reason about the world.   
To build this argument I will firstly consider how scientists use models and in so doing suggest that 
models can be usefully framed as forms of explanation.  This gives us a position from which to 
explore the relationship between scientific models and the phenomena they model.  When it comes 
to learning science however, students encounter the models which are used by scientists, but they 
also engage with words, gestures, pictures, videos, animations, physical models and symbolic 
representations.  These are all models in themselves, which represent and explain aspects of the 
phenomenon being taught.  The models that scientists use and the models that students learn 
through are connected: they are all explanations of the world, each embedded within the intentions 
and contexts of those who developed them.  Through recognising this I believe teachers can frame 
science as a way of explaining the world which draws on empirical evidence, but which is also bound 
to social processes and material context. 
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To develop this suggestion I will first of all consider how science itself relates models to the truth of 
the world.  I will then consider how students learn science through the modelling which they 
encounter in the classroom.  
Models and Forms of Truth  
After ten years of working with new science teachers I am still struck by how many of them portray 
their scientific careers as a series of stages in which they found out that everything they had been 
told previously was wrong.  A chemist might relate how at the age of 14, they realised the world 
wasn’t made up of particles, and at the age of 17 they were told that the idea of electrons in circular 
orbits is wrong.  For every student that does pursue further study in science, there must be 
countless many more who are put off by being treated like a child who couldn’t yet understand ‘real 
science’.   
This view of learning science as slowly being told the truth, is linked to the view that that scientific 
models provide a true picture of the world ‘as it is’.  This caricature of science is embedded within 
our culture and, as with all caricatures, is an exaggeration of key features.  The vast majority of 
scientists are realists, in that they believe that the universe exists independently of our observing it.  
However, scientific realism further attributes a relationship between the explanations developed by 
science and the world ‘as it is’.  A ‘strong’ view of realism is that models are very close to the reality 
of the world.  This does not mean that someone advocating strong realism necessarily considers 
science to be infallible; it could be that explanations need revision or further detail.  A ‘weak’ view of 
realism though, is that models are developed for a specific purpose, and that they represent reality 
only so far as they are useful.   
As Bridges (1999) suggests, empirical science draws heavily on a correspondence version of truth: a 
criteria for accepting a scientific explanation is how well an explanation is structurally similar to the 
phenomenon in question.  A strong realist position would be that this should be the main criteria for 
a model, that it is as close as possible to the phenomenon itself.  Such a strong position might well 
lead to students seeing schooling as the progression of different models, each ‘more true’ than the 
other.  However, strong realism is much critiqued in recent philosophy of science and is difficult to 
accept in the context of contemporary scientific practice. 
Even if we take correspondence to the natural world as a key criterion for scientific models, we 
cannot see this as a one-way street from empirical evidence to explanation.  Astronomer Royal, 
Frank Dyson, used Einstein’s theory of relativity to model how light is bent by the sun, which allowed 
Arthur Eddington to measure the position of stars in a solar eclipse of 1919.  More recently, the $13 
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billion spent on finding the Higgs boson and the $620 million upgrade to the LIGO machine to detect 
gravitational waves have been bets placed (and thankfully won) on the assumption that models are 
generative in predicting and explaining things that we have yet to see evidence of.  Kaldis (2013, p. 
662) suggests that scientists perform “surrogative reasoning” with models.  That is, they infer things 
about a phenomenon based on manipulation and investigation of models, rather than the 
phenomenon itself.  This accounts for how models explain features and processes that we have yet 
to gather evidence about.  
Models both explain and predict therefore.  However, this does not fully diminish the criteria of 
correspondence: If a model is closer to the phenomenon being modelled, then surely it will explain 
and/or predict more?  In order to counter this view, I find it useful to draw on the growing interest in 
complex systems.  Complex systems are characterised by their sensitivity to the minutiae of 
elements within them.  The famous conjecture here is that the flapping of the wings of a butterfly 
may affect the formation of a storm on the other side of the world.  Whether considering weather, 
earthquakes, ecosystems or social groups, a small difference may (or may not) have a big influence 
on the system.  These systems pose a particular challenge to how we frame models, as the omission 
of even the slightest detail means that a model will potentially develop in a very different way to the 
modelled phenomenon.  Complexity theory shows us that it does not make sense to talk of models 
which are ‘more complex’ being closer to reality.  Whether complex systems are modelled through 
statistical relationships, network models or sophisticated agent-based models, there remains the 
issue that all models are reductions.  This is not to say that resemblance to the phenomenon being 
investigated is not important, but it does undermine discussion about making models ‘more 
accurate’.   
Scientists use models to reason, explain and predict, but when they are looking at how well a model 
reproduces the phenomenon being modelled, they are often looking at a particular feature or aspect 
of that phenomenon.  We might say that a photograph gives us a more accurate image of a 
landscape than a drawing, but a schematic map is likely to be of more use for orienteering.  The 
judgement that takes place is actually about how well the model explains an aspect of the world, for 
a particular purpose, and this judgement is bound within the social processes of making models. 
To develop this, we will consider an example: Hill, Logan, Sellers and Zapala (2011) developed an 
agent-based model of the decision making within a baboon population, with reference to empirical 
data of a troop of chacma baboons.  By modelling range size, daily travel, energy and time budgets, 
Hill et al. describe how computational actors move within a grid of resources, after ‘voting’ whether 
they should move on.  Research on primate behaviour, cognitive processes and social structures was 
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employed and the model was run with a range of starting conditions to assess the influence of the 
model variables on the way the computer baboons behaved.  The conclusion to Hill et al.’s paper 
discusses how the coarse way in which the environment is presented, the sampling approach within 
the empirical data and difficulties in knowing how decisions are actually made led to the disparities 
found between the empirical data and modelling output.  So, what is the model for and how might it 
be judged?  There is certainly an aspect of the model being developed in order to refine modelling 
processes, forming the motivation for the involvement of a computer scientist.  The authors also 
argue that the model adds to a “growing body of evidence” about how decisions are made in 
primate societies, but there are no stronger arguments presented for what is actually learned about 
baboon behaviour, despite two of the authors being a biologist and an anthropologist.  As Kohler 
(2000) suggests, models of this type are ‘generative’, in that they provide possible mechanisms for 
the phenomenon we see.  So the way that baboons make decisions in Hill et al.’s model, was tested 
as a hypothesis in that it did not produce the behaviour seen in baboon life.  Carole Kenrick’s article 
gives a great example of how this might be recreated in the classroom (see page x), and how 
students can learn about the process of science from this.  Here, we can see that models are useful 
for both developing and testing hypotheses, but their construction also helps in developing the tools 
for further modelling.  Evaluating models therefore is not just about correspondence; models are not 
ways of getting to the universe ‘as it is’. 
As well as correspondence versions of truth, Bridges (1999) discusses coherence forms of truth, 
pragmatic forms of truth, consensus forms of truth and warranted belief: how well an explanation 
holds up to critical interrogation.  All of these are relevant to how models are evaluated within 
scientific practice.  Many scientific models are created which bear no relation to real phenomena at 
all, and this could be for a number of reasons: to teach others, to develop a method or approach, to 
make a theoretical point, to find a way of working, to attract a particular kind of funding, simply 
because the researchers are interested, and a whole host of other reasons.  Within this, models are 
evaluated according to how well they fit existing understanding (coherence, consensus), how useful 
they are for particular purposes (pragmatic), how far they can be justified to other (warranted 
belief), but also due to aesthetics (how ‘elegant’ the model is) or power relations (whether a 
renowned professor or new student is proposing it).  Correspondence is only one element of the 
criteria that scientists use to evaluate models, and I will go so far as to suggest that the form of 
realism employed by much of science is very weak indeed.  Models themselves form the focus of 
many scientist’s attention, rather than the phenomenon being modelled.   
Models as Explanations in the Classroom 
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If we wish to present an authentic view of science in the science classroom, then we cannot let 
students believe that science is the progression of increasingly accurate models, approaching the 
truth of the world.  However, it may not be wise to fully expose young scientists to what Feyerabend 
(1975) calls the ‘anarchy’ of scientific method: scientists use whatever methods they need to 
advance science.  As is evident from much of this edition of the journal, it falls to the teacher to 
decide how they will develop an understanding of the nature of science with their classes.  
Nevertheless, I suggest that we need to present a clear view of what science is and, given the 
prominence of models, this might be achieved by framing models as explanations.  This suggestion 
draws on the work of a broad group of researchers who have been working on the presentation and 
use of models within science classrooms for over 30 years now.   
In framing models, Gilbert, Boulter & Rutherford (2000) helpfully delineate five different forms of 
explanation:     
1. Intentional Explanation.  For example, in identifying the mode of operation of the AIDS virus 
with the intention of enabling prevention and cure. 
2. Descriptive explanation. This is where measurements of a phenomenon are presented, for 
example in considering variation in height between members of a class. 
3. Interpretive explanation.  Here we consider what a phenomenon is composed of, and much 
of chemistry consists of these abstractions. 
4. Causal explanation.  A description of why a phenomenon behaves as it does, for example 
why there is variation in the heights of class members. 
5. Predictive explanation. Considering how the phenomenon will behave under specified 
conditions. 
Models are thus simplified representations of phenomena which scientists use to explain, predict 
and reason about aspects of the world.  This characterisation is still a rather idealised form of the 
nature of science and a cynic may claim that models are sometimes developed to attract funding, or 
to develop the tools of modelling itself.  However, these might be seen as forms of ‘intentional 
explanation’, or a teacher might discuss the how science should be vs how it is. 
What is also required though is an account of how models develop over time.  Gilbert, Boulter and 
Elmer (2000) specify terms which are helpful here.  They label expressed models as those 
representations placed within the public domain by an individual or group.  Different social groups 
may then agree that a model is of value, at which point it may be labelled as consensus model.  If 
such a model is tested experimentally, peer reviewed and accepted by scientists it may then become 
a scientific model.  The exact nature of how scientific models develop and become replaced (thus 
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becoming historic models) is contested within the philosophy and history of science.  Nevertheless, 
clarifying relationship between expressed, consensus and scientific models goes some way to 
providing a coherent account of the social and scientific processes involved in using models. 
In my own practice, I have also found it useful to make a distinction between a model and a theory 
(you may have noticed above my claim that Dawson developed a ‘model’ based on Einstein’s 
‘theory’ of relativity).  This is not something that scientists themselves provide a clear distinction of, 
with many using the terms interchangeably.  However, I have found a distinction from mathematical 
model theory to be of assistance: 
 “A theory admits a variety of models.  The theory is not a theory of any one model in 
particular, but theorizes an aspect of anything that happens to be a model for that theory.” 
(Holdsworth, 2006, pp. 146-7)  
That is, a model provides a description of a particular phenomenon, and multiple models support 
and develop a theory.  For example, a particle model of matter provides us with an explanation of 
how a solid turns into a liquid when heated.  A different particle model of matter can explain the 
relationship between pressure, volume and temperature in a gas.  These might be seen as fitting 
particle theory.  When we move on to explaining rates of reaction and surface area then, we may 
develop a model of interactions between particles to explain this.  This framing goes some way to 
invoking the role of coherence and consensus in scientific modelling also: a model is informed by 
established theory at the time it is developed. 
Drawing on the work of John Gilbert and colleagues, I have here presented models as explanations 
which serve specific purposes, and claimed that those models gather evidence and support within 
communities of scientists as they are tested and discussed.  This is undoubtedly a simplified account 
of the messy and often incoherent ways in which models are used by scientists.  However, such a 
framing provides a coherent view of models whilst still allowing for discussion of the multifaceted 
questions that models are developed to answer, and the social influences that affect communities of 
scientists.  This allows the teacher to gauge just how much messiness to introduce into the 
discussion, and when! 
Modelling-based Teaching 
So far I have presented a case for framing models as explanations, and suggested that this links 
professional science and the science in classrooms.  In many ways though, teachers have a much 
more difficult job than scientists when it comes to models.  Teachers engage with a huge variety of 
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models every day, and are concerned not just with how models relate to the phenomena being 
discussed, but also how students will learn from those models. 
Something as seemingly simple as introducing the heart may involve a plethora of models of 
different types (Boulter & Buckley, 2000): we might show a plastic heart (concrete representation), 
draw a diagram (visual), show a heart monitor display (mathematical), clench our fist and place it 
near our chest (gestural), or describe the heart as two pumps (verbal).  What is more these models 
might be static or dynamic, and often involved mixed modes of representation, for example an 
animation with labels and commentary.  Students learn from these models, but they learn both 
about the consensus view of scientific understanding, and the relation of models to scientific 
practice.  Sadly, the latter is often ignored, despite being an important part of the curriculum  
In England and Wales, The National Strategy Framework for Teaching Science (DfES, 2002) 
advocated 11-14 years olds engaging with, developing and critically evaluating models in relation to 
different phenomena.  In the 2007 version of the curriculum, this translated into models being a key 
part of the ‘How Science Works’ agenda, with progression through levels clearly mapped to the 
capacity of students to use, develop and critique models within explanations.  We now know that 
the labelling of students as particular ‘levels’ often restricted their progress, but nevertheless the 
development of modelling has been a key part of science curricula for some time.  The latest 
national curriculum for 11-14 year olds (DfE, 2013, p.3) states that students should “use modelling 
and abstract ideas to develop and evaluate explanations”.  It goes on to then explicitly mention 
models of pressure, chromosomes, DNA, the particle model, atomic model and light rays.  It may 
surprise teachers in England to know that those who designed the latest curriculum intended the list 
of content to provide space for teachers to support the broader development of students’ subject 
understandings (see Tim Oates talking about this: http://bit.ly/1xj893h).  In most schools this has 
simply not come to pass, with schemes of work focusing on content being delivered, rather than an 
understanding of the skills, processes and nature of science.  Poor communication around the latest 
curriculum, pressures around tests for 16 year olds (often leading to Key Stage 3 being compressed), 
and a lack of understanding in this area means that students are simply not engaging with models 
explicitly, as an integral part of science education. 
Gilbert & Justi (2016) have recently brought together decades of research in this area to outline and 
support an approach to ‘modelling-based teaching’.  Here I will draw on and develop one of their 
examples (Gilbert & Justi, 2016, pp. 72–74) in order to exemplify an approach to engaging students 
with models, but also to explore how students learn through models.  The creation, expression, 
testing and evaluation of a model does not take place in a simple and linear way, so the stages below 
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should not be seen as prescription which ignores the constant interaction between thought, the 
expressed model and evaluation of it in relation to particular aims.  To aid the reader I will present 
the possible stages of engaging with a model though: 
 Firstly, students might research or conduct an experiment to understand a phenomenon, for 
example the evaporation of water from a saltwater solution.  The first stage of a modelling 
approach might be to then pose a particular aim for a model, such as producing a model of 
the salt after evaporation.  Gilbert & Justi say that students use their existing understanding 
to pose a mental proto-model through engaging their current understanding, information 
and experiences, in relation to the aims of the model.  They may use an analogy or 
mathematical to do this.   
 In the next stage, expression of the model, the students work in small groups to produce a 
model, a representation.  Many students develop a NaCl molecule model, which could be 
expressed verbally or visually, or physically using two bound balls.   
 The next stage is to test these models, for example by asking students why sodium chloride 
has such a high melting point.  Some students respond to this by making claim that ‘the’ 
bond between sodium and chlorine ions is very strong.  So, a second test might be to ask 
why salt crystals can be cleaved along specific planes.  The teacher is here able to present 
the testing of models as part of scientific development, but also pose tests which introduce 
elements that are missing from student models.  The balance between student autonomy 
and creativity and teacher interjection should develop over time.   
 A further stage of the modelling process is to evaluate models.  Here the teacher may ask 
groups to justify their model, and the class may come up with a consensus model based on 
these discussions.  If models are framed as explanations which serve specific purposes, as I 
have claimed above, then the limitations and scope of those models should be bought to the 
fore in relation to those purposes.  This might be extended to see how far the model can be 
generalised though, such as by seeing how far their model of NaCl is able to explain the 
properties of MgO (which has even higher melting points but is not very soluble). 
 Furthermore, a teacher may then add further evidence to guide the model towards scientific 
consensus.  For example, lattices may have no distinct structure in student models, so 
evidence from X-ray spectra might be brought in to support lattice shapes, which students 
can integrate into their models. 
Gilbert & Justi frame models as ‘epistemic artefacts’ in the classroom, from which students develop 
understanding of both established scientific models but also the process of modeling.  From multiple 
studies across the world, they have established that teaching science in this way greatly enhances 
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both student understanding of scientific content and skills but also provides a vehicle for developing 
an understanding of nature of science.  The latter depends on teachers actively engaging students 
with this however. 
Learning through Models - Beyond Concepts 
Modelling-based teaching allows students to learn from the process of engaging with models in a 
way which approximates the work of scientists, such that students learn both content and the 
processes of modelling.  I want to develop here the stronger argument that students, like scientists, 
actually reason through the models that they engage with. 
To develop this point let us reconsider the different ways that a heart may be modelled in the 
classroom.  Imagine that a group of students build a model for the heart using plastic bottles and bits 
of tubing, and that they use it to discuss energy transfer from respiration and pressure in explaining 
how blood is pumped around the body.  National curricula documents frame energy transfer, 
respiration and pressure as scientific concepts and therefore such a model may involve utilising and 
learning multiple concepts.   
But how do students actually learn from these models and concepts?  There is a tradition within 
science education of considering learning as the development of concepts within student’s minds.  
This has its roots in constructivist learning theory, and was developed in earnest in the 1980s and 
90s when a lot of research focused on the misconceptions that students have and how they might be 
detected and addressed.  Despite the wealth of research into the conceptual development of 
students, there still remain philosophical difficulties in defining where and what concepts actually 
are: how do they relate to brains, bodies and broader context?  However, here I want to focus on 
how constructivism has been interpreted in many science classrooms, namely as the development of 
mental concepts.   
Focus on concepts often implies to teachers that students are somehow acquiring an understanding 
of the phenomenon itself through the activities they engage with in classrooms.  As someone who 
spends much of my time in other teacher’s classrooms, I have lost count of the number of times I 
have seen students use guess work, whispers and the coaxing of answers out of a teacher to 
complete a worksheet labelling the parts of a cell, heart, atom or power station.  Some teachers are 
then surprised that the students are not able to label a completely different diagram in the next 
lesson, or to explain the function of the components they have labelled.  The point is that the 
students in such cases have interacted with a particular model, and this does not entail the 
transmission of conceptual understanding about the phenomenon itself.   
10 
 
Gilbert and Justi are keen to move the terms concepts and models away from the sense of denoting 
mental representations of the world ‘as it is’, and instead consider them as ‘artefacts’ which have 
material presence in the classroom.  As such, when laying out modelling-based teaching, they 
suggest that: 
“mental models are epistemic creations, human-made artefacts, usually materialised in 
some way for sharing with others, that attempt to depict the world-as-experience by 
imagining what it is like.” (Gilbert & Justi, Rosaria, 2016, p. 83) 
The models expressed in a classroom are not the manifestation of coherent mental representations, 
but emerge from the brains, bodies and material circumstances involved in expressing them.   Whilst 
Gilbert and Justi see this as congruent with what they call ‘the broad church of constructivism’, I 
believe that the terminology and common interpretation of conceptual change research is a barrier 
to teachers.  Despite a focus on learning from each other and the world around us, constructivism 
has been interpreted as being about the development of mental concepts towards consensus views 
of the world.  This interpretation leads to teachers characterising learning as the intangible 
development of mental concepts/models, and in turn to them not focusing on the specifics of what 
is being presented and developed within the classroom. 
So how might teachers be helped to focus on models as integral to learning and reasoning in science 
classrooms?  A first step is to recognise that learning is often evaluated on the basis of a student 
being able to respond to a question, problem or circumstance in a certain way.  This is relatively easy 
to define with recall of information to a simple question, for example, how many ventricles does the 
heart have?  Here a student recognises the word ventricle in relation to the word heart and 
produces a very simple model though stating that there are two, even if that is all they know about 
ventricles.  If what is being evaluated is a student’s capacity to explain how the heart evolved to 
pump blood around the body, then the student might use words, diagrams, hold their fist to their 
chest or make a model; they may do all of this.  This involves a ‘mental model’ insofar as the brain of 
the student is able to utilise the resources available in the context (including her own body) to 
express models that explain how the heart pumps blood.   
This is subtly different to framing learning as the development of intangible mental representations 
of phenomena; the shift in focus is towards expressed models, which emerge from the interplay of 
brains and material context.  This framing allows us to consider the influence of the specifics of 
context, and this in turn will allow us to bring growing insights from educational neuroscience to 
bear on learning.  Moreover, recognising that students both learn through and are assessed on their 
use of models in explaining phenomenon, promotes teachers considering carefully the models which 
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emerge within classrooms.  In this article, I have taken a broad definition of models as including the 
words, diagrams, physical models and animations we use to explain things, but also the gestures 
that teachers deploy in the classroom.  I have also argued that students learn through the models 
they see, express and evaluate.  This means that as students learn they do so through the models 
which emerge in classrooms. 
Models, Truth and Teaching Science 
Here I wish to bring together two threads within this article to argue that a great deal of what both 
professional scientists and student do is engage with models, and this is what links learning and 
doing science.  This link also gives us a perspective on what science is about, and how the portrayal 
of ‘truth’ in science is bound up in how scientists develop and use models.  Individual scientists have 
different roles of course, and might be engaged in developing an experiment, gathering evidence or 
classifying information.  All these processes involve the use and development of models however. 
I have suggested that although correspondence to empirical evidence should be a key criterion for 
how we evaluate our explanations of the world, we cannot use this criterion alone.  The ‘truth’ of a 
model is bound with coherence, pragmatism, consensus, warranted belief, aesthetics and power 
relations.  Models, by which I mean all explanations in science, are not objective truths, despite what 
some pupils may think.  I have also suggested that we need to move beyond characterising student’s 
‘mental models’ as coherent understandings which develop and have correspondence to the models 
that students express.    
Putting these arguments together we can see that models, manifest in the material of the world, 
cannot be perfect replications of a phenomenon.  Models exist in a different space and time to the 
‘original’ phenomenon, and they are usually made of very different stuff, as David Hay expounds in 
the next article.  In Hay’s account, models are seen to take shape in relations between ‘things’ (non-
human stuff) like beetles, paper, plastic, plasticine, computer code or any other stuff, as well as in 
the human body with its kinaesthetic sensitivities, its feelings and its thought.  We use models to 
communicate, reason, predict, explain and do things in the world, but we also make and use models 
just to get to grips with stuff before we ever have words to talk about it.  My advocating models as 
forms of explanation should not be seen as claiming that there is a progression from empirical 
experience of a phenomena to explanation.  Hay’s article engages with the other side of the 
performative idiom in science, and our two articles should be read as two sides of the same coin, 
which together give that coin due value in the matter of its weight. 
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I finish my account by emphasising two important issues.  Firstly, the account which I provide ought 
to encourage science teachers to reconsider the models that they deploy in the classroom.  Students 
learn through the models that they express and engage with, and this is not just about the concepts 
listed in curricula, it is also about how the process of doing science is modelled.  Secondly, if we are 
to present science as a coherent and authentic subject, we must recognise that science is the 
process of explaining features of the world through the development and evaluation of models.  This 
process is messy, as is the way that students learn in classrooms.  However, relating how scientists 
learn about the world and how students learn about science, encourages teachers to place 
modelling at the heart of science classroom. 
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